EVMs more secure, say experts

Terming electronic voting machines (EVMs) as more secured, experts said the EVM model that the Election Commission (EC) in Bangladesh has adopted has no "extra risk". At present, there are incidents of malpractice by presiding officers during election or invasion of a polling centre by party cadres and forced stamping of ballot papers. In EVMs, certain micro-chips could be used to alter the programming and the number of votes against an electoral symbol could be tampered with.

But there is no risk of remote vote tampering, as EVMs are not connected with each other or a central server, experts said. The design documents of EVMs, prepared by the researchers of the Institute of Information and Communication Technology (IICT) of BUET, explains the whole system of voting with these machines.

As per the IICT documents, each EVM has a smart card and the machine will be functional only if the particular smart card is installed. The smart card is supplied by the EC to the assistant presiding officer of a polling centre.

The EVM has two units, namely control unit and ballot unit. The units are connected with each other by wire. The control unit is placed in front of the assistant presiding officer, while the ballot unit is placed inside the voting booth.

The control unit has a digital display and several buttons -- "ballot", "start", "close", "memory clear", "demo result" and "final result".    

The "start" button is used to initiate the voting process. If an experimental vote is being stored in the machine memory, the "start" button will not work until that vote is deleted by using the "memory clear" button. Once the "start" button is pressed, no experimental vote can be placed and the "memory clear" button becomes dysfunctional.

The "demo result" button, used to see the result of experimental voting, also becomes dysfunctional with the pressing of "start".    

By pressing the "ballot" button, the assistant presiding officer starts the ballot unit and sends a voter to the booth to cast his vote. As soon as the single vote is cast, the ballot unit becomes dysfunctional until the next pressing of the "ballot" button.

The "close" button is used to stop the whole voting process of a polling centre permanently. If there is any attack on the polling centre, this button can be pressed to stop the voting. Once this button is pressed, the EVM at that particular centre can only be used for seeing the voting result by pressing the "final result" button.

The ballot unit displays all electoral symbols with a button against each of the symbols. A voter can cast his vote only if the green light at the upper portion of the ballot machine is on. The green light is on when the assistant presiding officer presses the "ballot" button from the control unit.

A voter can press a button against an electoral symbol only once. Once the button is pressed, the vote is cast and it is shown in the control unit

and stored in the memory chip. Also, when a vote is cast, the red light at the lower portion of the EVM will light up. After that it doesn’t matter if a voter presses the button several times again as no more votes will be considered.

Also, if a voter presses buttons against several electoral symbols, the voter will hear a “bip-bip”’ sound, which means, the vote hasn’t been cast. The voter then can re-press only one button to register his vote.

 Each ballot unit has place for accommodating 12 electoral symbols. So, if the number of candidates is higher, more ballot units can be added. Each machine runs on 12 volts, so there is no risk of electric shock. Also, the battery power lasts 12 hours, which makes the machine not vulnerable to load-shedding.

 Explaining the EVM security measures, Prof Dr Lutful Kabir, former director of the IICT and the head researcher of the EVM project, told The Independent that the ballot unit of the EVM becomes dysfunctional for 10 seconds once a vote is cast.

 So, there is no scope for malpractice, because once a vote is cast, the display at the control unit shows the casting of vote and the ballot unit will not start within the next 10 seconds. By that time, the voter has to get out of the booth in the presence of polling agents, Dr Kabir said.

 In case of an attack on the polling centre by party cadres, the voting process could be stopped by pressing the “close” button. Also, if the smart card is removed from the EVM, the machine will not work, he added.

 “Suppose, an assistant presiding officer helps a party cadre to cast votes, the vote has to be cast by pressing the electoral symbol button on the ballot unit and this process will take a lot of time. Only five votes can be cast per minute,” he said.

 “So, the system is much more secured than the ballot paper one, in which the polling centre could be invaded and the ballot box easily replaced to alter the election results,” he said.

 Prof Kabir also said that each EVM has a programme installed which functions as per election rules. “The programme will be installed in the EVM at the time of election only after an expert panel verifies it. Once the programme is installed, it can’t be changed. So, there is no risk of vote tempering at the field level,” IICT director said.

 But he said that no electronic system in the world is “totally secured”. The smart card supplied to the assistant presiding officer could be made and the fake card could alter the results in the EVM. “But in that case, the password with the smart card needs to be hacked which is technically very difficult,” he added.

 Also, if a centre is invaded, a certain microchip could be installed in the EVM which could alter the pre-installed programme and change the results, he said.

“But these are all possibilities that prevail in a manual voting system. And the security measures that are taken in the EVM is much more secured”, he said.

 Articles from the internet said the EVM model in Bangladesh has similarities with the one used in India. A US experts group has termed the Indian EVM system as faulty, even though India is considered one of the successful countries in the world in adopting EVMs. (85 per cent of the countries have failed in adopting EVM).

 About the Indian EVM, Dr Kabir said the Bangladeshi EVM is more secured because of the smart card. (Indian EVMs do not have the smart card system.) “Also, our EVMs do not have touch screen like that of the Indian one, which can be hacked through remote sensing. For a fair election, EVMs are a better option than the ballot paper system,” he said.

MK

 

 

EVMs more secure, say experts

Terming electronic voting machines (EVMs) as more secured, experts said the EVM model that the Election Commission (EC) in Bangladesh has adopted has no extra risk. At present, there are incidents of malpractice by presiding officers during election or invasion of a polling centre by party cadres and forced stamping of ballot papers. In EVMs, certain micro-chips could be used to alter the programming and the number of votes against an electoral symbol could be tampered with. But there is no risk of remote vote tampering, as EVMs are not connected with each other or a central server, experts said. The design documents of EVMs, prepared by the researchers of the Institute of Information and Communication Technology (IICT) of BUET, explains the whole system of voting with these machines. As per the IICT documents, each EVM has a smart card and the machine will be functional only if the particular smart card is installed. The smart card is supplied by the EC to the assistant presiding officer of a polling centre. The EVM has two units, namely control unit and ballot unit. The units are connected with each other by wire. The control unit is placed in front of the assistant presiding officer, while the ballot unit is placed inside the voting booth. The control unit has a digital display and several buttons -- ballot, start, close, memory clear, demo result and final result. The start button is used to initiate the voting process. If an experimental vote is being stored in the machine memory, the start button will not work until that vote is deleted by using the memory clear button. Once the start button is pressed, no experimental vote can be placed and the memory clear button becomes dysfunctional. The demo result button, used to see the result of experimental voting, also becomes dysfunctional with the pressing of start. By pressing the ballot button, the assistant presiding officer starts the ballot unit and sends a voter to the booth to cast his vote. As soon as the single vote is cast, the ballot unit becomes dysfunctional until the next pressing of the ballot button. The close button is used to stop the whole voting process of a polling centre permanently. If there is any attack on the polling centre, this button can be pressed to stop the voting. Once this button is pressed, the EVM at that particular centre can only be used for seeing the voting result by pressing the final result button. The ballot unit displays all electoral symbols with a button against each of the symbols. A voter can cast his vote only if the green light at the upper portion of the ballot machine is on. The green light is on when the assistant presiding officer presses the ballot button from the control unit. A voter can press a button against an electoral symbol only once. Once the button is pressed, the vote is cast and it is shown in the control unit and stored in the memory chip. Also, when a vote is cast, the red light at the lower portion of the EVM will light up. After that it doesnt matter if a voter presses the button several times again as no more votes will be considered. Also, if a voter presses buttons against several electoral symbols, the voter will hear a bip-bip sound, which means, the vote hasnt been cast. The voter then can re-press only one button to register his vote. Each ballot unit has place for accommodating 12 electoral symbols. So, if the number of candidates is higher, more ballot units can be added. Each machine runs on 12 volts, so there is no risk of electric shock. Also, the battery power lasts 12 hours, which makes the machine not vulnerable to load-shedding. Explaining the EVM security measures, Prof Dr Lutful Kabir, former director of the IICT and the head researcher of the EVM project, told The Independent that the ballot unit of the EVM becomes dysfunctional for 10 seconds once a vote is cast. So, there is no scope for malpractice, because once a vote is cast, the display at the control unit shows the casting of vote and the ballot unit will not start within the next 10 seconds. By that time, the voter has to get out of the booth in the presence of polling agents, Dr Kabir said. In case of an attack on the polling centre by party cadres, the voting process could be stopped by pressing the close button. Also, if the smart card is removed from the EVM, the machine will not work, he added. Suppose, an assistant presiding officer helps a party cadre to cast votes, the vote has to be cast by pressing the electoral symbol button on the ballot unit and this process will take a lot of time. Only five votes can be cast per minute, he said. So, the system is much more secured than the ballot paper one, in which the polling centre could be invaded and the ballot box easily replaced to alter the election results, he said. Prof Kabir also said that each EVM has a programme installed which functions as per election rules. The programme will be installed in the EVM at the time of election only after an expert panel verifies it. Once the programme is installed, it cant be changed. So, there is no risk of vote tempering at the field level, IICT director said. But he said that no electronic system in the world is totally secured. The smart card supplied to the assistant presiding officer could be made and the fake card could alter the results in the EVM. But in that case, the password with the smart card needs to be hacked which is technically very difficult, he added. Also, if a centre is invaded, a certain microchip could be installed in the EVM which could alter the pre-installed programme and change the results, he said. But these are all possibilities that prevail in a manual voting system. And the security measures that are taken in the EVM is much more secured, he said. Articles from the internet said the EVM model in Bangladesh has similarities with the one used in India. A US experts group has termed the Indian EVM system as faulty, even though India is considered one of the successful countries in the world in adopting EVMs. (85 per cent of the countries have failed in adopting EVM). About the Indian EVM, Dr Kabir said the Bangladeshi EVM is more secured because of the smart card. (Indian EVMs do not have the smart card system.) Also, our EVMs do not have touch screen like that of the Indian one, which can be hacked through remote sensing. For a fair election, EVMs are a better option than the ballot paper system, he said. MK